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Plural Perils 
Roger Bernhardt 
California mortgage law is a source of endless astonishment to the rest of the country. 
Elsewhere, a fearful lender takes security for a loan in order to improve its position and to 
increase its remedies; here, however, a lender that takes a mortgage finds its options reduced as a 
result of our one-action rule (CCP §726). Some recent cases seem to be creating a related version 
of that same principle of reduced rights in multiple-security situations, making it considerably 
more risky to hold two pieces of security rather than just one. 
Aspen Enters., Inc. v Bodge 
Aspen Enters., Inc. v Bodge (1995) 37 CA4th 1811, 44 CR2d 763 (reported at p 16), arising 
from the Fourth Appellate District, is a gentle introduction to this theme. A major difference 
between California’s Commercial Code and its real estate foreclosure statutes is that every aspect 
of a real estate trustee sale is legislatively (and minutely) regulated, whereas the Commercial 
Code eschews such detailed regulation in favor of an overriding “commercial reasonableness” 
standard. 
In the mixed personal property/real property security context, where the two regimes come 
together, Com C §9501 permits a lender to deal with the collateral either through separate sales 
of the real and personal property, or by a unified sale of both together. The legal difference is 
that, in separate sales, the personal property is governed by Commercial Code rules, whereas in a 
unified sale the personal property is governed by the real estate statutes. This statutory 
arrangement might lead a naive lender to believe that it can trade the vagueness of judicially 
determined commercial reasonableness for the safe harbors of legislative details by choosing a 
unified sale and having the personal property security recharacterized as real estate. Aspen 
Enters., however, holds that the threshold choice of unified versus separate foreclosure must 
itself be commercially reasonable. Commercial reasonableness is a factor even when the real 
estate system is selected; the commercial reasonableness standard can be bypassed only when it 
is commercially reasonable to do so. 
It would certainly have been silly for the Aspen Enters. lender to sell its debtor’s tire store 
inventory at the same unified sale of the debtor’s residence, but the decision does not stop there. 
Even in the classic hotel foreclosure situation, a court could rule that the lender should not have 
forced potential buyers to make a blanket bid covering the hotel’s soap and towels as well as the 
real estate. The unified sale may wind up forcing lenders to comply with the Commercial Code 
and the real estate rules at the same time (as the supreme court’s recent decision in Ford & 
Vlahos v ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. (1994) 8 C4th 1220, 36 CR2d 464, seems to portend). 
Western Sec. Bank v Superior Court*  
Western Sec. Bank v Superior Court (1995) 38 CA4th 1241, 45 CR2d 664 (reported at 18 CEB 
Real Prop L Rep 336 (Nov. 1995)), is the most demonstrative (and notorious) of the decisions 
showing judicial antipathy to creditors’ use of multiple security. The Second Appellate District 
went far beyond simply denying retroactivity to new CCP §580.5, which upholds letters of credit 
in real estate financing and declares a legislative intent to abrogate the first Western Sec. decision 
(see Murray, What Should I Do With This Letter of Credit?, 17 CEB Real Prop L Rep 133 (Apr. 
1994)). The Western Sec. opinion pointedly signaled the judges’ displeasure at the legislation, 
declaring it unwise and warning that compliance (even in prospective cases) may generate other 
                                                 
*
 On January 18, 1996, the California Supreme Court granted review of the Western Sec. case (S037504), and the 1111 Prospect 
case (S038657). 
judicial obstacles. Footnote 15 of the opinion ominously observes that, even when a lender draws 
on its letter of credit before, rather than after, foreclosing, “[t]his might well cure an existing 
default or require a new notice of default which would provide additional rights to the borrower.” 
38 CA4th at 1263 n15. Piecemeal collection steps performed uninterruptedly may now be headed 
for trouble; if each collection step represents a potential cure of the default or a mandate for a 
new notice of default, the overall process will be considerably lengthened. 
Bank of S. Cal. v Dombrow 
Bank of S. Cal. v Dombrow (1995) 39 CA4th 1457, 46 CR2d 656 (see Muñoz, Bank of S. Cal. 
v Dombrow: The Specter of Equity Continues To Haunt Lenders, p 8), like Aspen Enters., also 
came from the Fourth Appellate District. Dombrow is the opinion that should worry lenders 
most. Its decision to give guarantors the protection of the fair market value limitations of CCP 
§580a (see California Mortgage and Deed of Trust Practice §§4.17–4.22 (2d ed Cal CEB 1990) 
may significantly impair recourse to all multiple security. For over 50 years (since Hatch v 
Security First Nat’l Bank (1942) 19 C2d 254, 120 P2d 869), our courts have held that the fair 
value principle does not apply to multiple security because the sale of additional security is not 
the same as a deficiency judgment. Because a guaranty is generally regarded as a kind of 
additional security, guarantors have consequently suffered from the same lack of fair value 
protection. 
It may be correct that most cases have ignored the fact that the distinction between guarantors 
and sureties has been statutorily abolished; but the reasons that Dombrow gives for then applying 
CCP §580a to guarantors—that trustee sales are nonredeemable and that CCP §580a refers to an 
“obligation” rather than merely to a “note”—are no less true for all additional security. After the 
sale of an asset, Dombrow may require a lender with multiple security to return to court for a fair 
value hearing before the lender can collect on its next asset (letter of credit, debtor’s tire 
inventory, or whatever). 
Indeed, the lender may have greater difficulty going after inanimate additional security than in 
going after a human guarantor. Dombrow allowed for the possibility of a guarantor fair value 
waiver; in light of the Cathay Bank saga, however (Cathay Bank v Lee (1993) 14 CA4th 1533, 
18 CR2d 420 (Gradsky guarantor defense waiver held invalid)), we are sure to see no end of 
problems in that regard. Further, no court that decides that a debtor’s additional security is 
protected by the fair value rule is going to permit the debtor personally to waive that protection 
(until the legislature tells it otherwise, and even then the outcome is doubtful). 
1111 Prospect Partners, L.P. v Superior Court* 
1111 Prospect Partners, L.P. v Superior Court (1995) 38 CA4th 570, 45 CR2d 338 (reported 
at 18 CEB Real Prop L Rep 335 (Nov. 1995)), also arising from the Fourth Appellate District, 
comes almost as a surprise in holding that a draw on a letter of credit as a first step after default 
(e.g., a preforeclosure draw) does not bring the one-action rule sanction into play (which would 
prohibit any subsequent foreclosure of the real property security). It represents the only instance 
in these four cases in which a lender gained an undisputed advantage from being multiply 
secured. 
Of course, a contrary decision in 1111 Prospect, especially when combined with Western 
Sec.’s treatment of the reverse facts, would have really boxed lenders in: To first foreclose on the 
real estate would bar recourse to the letter of credit because of CCP §580d, and to first draw on 
the letter of credit would bar foreclosure on the real estate because of CCP §726! But then, is 
such an outcome really inconceivable in California? 
 
